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WHAT’S IN A NAME?
PRICE VARIATION IN







In the United States and Canada new sports facilities costing over $6 billion are
either currently under construction or being planned for the next decade. The financ-
ing of these facilities has become an important economic and political issue in many
cities across North America. In recent years numerous studies and papers have ex-
amined sport facility financing, which have helped to fuel the debate on the use of
public money to finance construction. Zimbalist [2000] notes that consulting firms
under contract with cities or teams have conducted dozens of studies, and not sur-
prisingly they have generally found that professional sports teams have substantial
positive impacts on their cities. In contrast, most academic research in this area,
such as Noll and Zimbalist [1997] and Baade [2000], suggest that it is difficult to
justify public financing because the quantifiable costs of construction outweigh the
benefits. While most papers in this literature have reached similar conclusions there
is some disagreement among academics. One of the main reasons for differing con-
clusions on the use of public funding is the wide range of methods used for measuring
the benefits derived from sports facilities. For instance, Irani [1997] estimated net
consumer surplus derived from new sports facilities in major league baseball, and his
findings supported the use of public funding for a number of facilities. Meanwhile,
Johnson and Whitehead [2000] used a contingent valuation method and found that
public financing is not justifiable for the facilities they examined. Thus, much of the
literature has focused on different ways to measure the benefits derived from facili-
ties while little attention has been paid to the changing structure of sports facility
financing. An element of this changing structure is the increasing importance of cor-
porate sponsorship through naming rights.
As facility naming rights prices have increased dramatically in recent years the
portion of facility construction costs that must be financed by public and team funds360 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
has decreased. If the amount that firms are willing to pay to sponsor a sports facility
continues to grow, this could have a significant impact on the decisions of numerous
cities considering building a new facility. To better measure the need for public fi-
nancing of sports facilities, therefore, we need to understand what determines the
value of potential naming rights deals. The current paper adds to the literature on
sports facility financing by identifying the determinants of the value of naming rights
thus furthering our understanding of the need for public funding of sports facility
construction.
With the rapid expansion of naming rights deals in the mid-1990s, more than
half of all major professional sport facilities now bear the name of a corporation.
Despite its growing importance with respect to the financing of sports facilities, very
little research has examined the naming rights market. The small body of literature
analyzing facility-naming rights has primarily focused on the use of naming rights as
a marketing tool. McCarthy and Irwin [1998], Welch and Calabro [1997], and Kaydo
and Trusdell [1997] all studied the marketing aspects of facility naming rights. For
example, McCarthy and Irwin [1998] discussed the marketing methods that corpo-
rate sponsors may use to maximize their naming rights investments. McCarthy and
Irwin [2000] extended their research by analyzing the corporate motivations behind
the acquisition of naming rights. In addition, Team Marketing Report, Incorporated
has annually produced a publication entitled Naming Rights Deals [1999] that re-
ports on the financial, legal, and marketing aspects of facility naming rights. While
the possible factors that influence the price of naming rights are discussed, no at-
tempt is made to empirically study the factors that affect the price paid by corporate
sponsors. In fact, an extensive review of the literature found no studies that measure
the quantitative relationship between naming rights prices and the factors that in-
fluence these prices.
This paper attempts to identify the determinants of the price of stadium naming
rights. We develop a model of the naming rights market where the objective of the
facility owner is to maximize revenue, and the objective of the sponsor is to allocate
its advertising budget efficiently. From the simple theoretical model, we derive re-
duced-form equations for the owner’s reservation price and the sponsor’s maximum
offer price for naming rights. In developing an econometric model for the naming
rights market, perhaps the most critical thing to recognize is that the sample is trun-
cated. For the facilities that are named we observe the characteristics of the facility
and the price that sponsors are willing to pay for the naming rights. However, for the
unnamed facilities we observe the characteristics of the facility but not the price that
potential sponsors are willing to pay. From the econometric literature on limited
dependent variables, we know that if this type of truncation is not accounted for, the
coefficient estimates for the price determinants may be biased and inconsistent. By
using a model developed by Heckman we are able to obtain consistent estimates of
the price determinants.1
The results suggest that the key determinant for whether a facility is named is
the extent to which the existing name is recognized. Facilities with widely recognized
names are unlikely to be sponsored while newer facilities with little or no name rec-
ognition value are likely to be named. In addition, the presence of a new team, either361 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
through expansion or relocation, is positively related to the price paid by a sponsor
for the facility naming rights. It appears that corporate sponsors value the additional
exposure that will come to a facility due to the arrival of a new team. We also show
that the real price of facility naming rights is higher in more populated areas. This is
consistent with the belief that sponsors are willing to pay more to advertise to a
larger audience. We also show that the average real price for naming rights has
increased significantly over time and that this growth has greatly exceeded the rate
of growth in prices of other forms of advertising. Somewhat surprisingly we also find
that the price for facility naming rights is independent of the number of games played
at the facility, the median income in the area around the facility, the on-field success
of the teams that play at the facility, the ownership structure of the facility (public
vs. private), average attendance at sporting events, and the cost of construction.
THE MARKET FOR SPORTS FACILITY NAMES
The sale of sport facility names in the United States began in 1973 when Rich
Products Corporation paid $1.5 million for the rights to the home of the Buffalo Bills
for the next 25 years.2 In the 27 years that have followed, corporations have spent
over $2.3 billion to place their names and logos on major professional sport facilities
[Bonham, 2000].3 While some consumers still have a distaste for the use of corporate
names, the growth in revenue generated by naming rights deals has made corporate
sponsorship commonplace. As shown in Appendix A, corporations such as Federal
Express, American Airlines, and Staples have recently made considerable invest-
ments to acquire naming rights.
The literature on stadium names commonly cites several reasons why companies
purchase naming rights. The most important reasons identified by companies ap-
pear to be the pursuit of community citizenship and goodwill, and to increase sales/
market share [McCarthy and Irwin, 2000]. At the local level, companies benefit from
naming a facility for several reasons. People in the area may take a more positive
view of a corporation if they believe that the firm played a key role in providing a
state-of-the-art facility for the region. In addition, as facility construction has be-
come a significant factor in the location decisions of many pro teams, corporate spon-
sors may also be credited with retaining the local team or for bringing the new team
to town. Lastly, corporations also benefit by simply having their name associated
with the city’s favorite team.4 On the national level, the attraction of naming a sports
facility is that it provides very cost-effective advertising and exposure. Several ex-
amples help to illustrate the point.5 Greenberg [1999] pointed out that when the
Phoenix Suns hosted the Chicago Bulls during the NBA finals in 1993, 30-second
commercial spots were selling for $300,000, while that same year America West Air-
lines paid $583,495 for the naming rights to the Suns’ arena. Thus, for less than the
cost of a one-minute advertisement America West had their name mentioned or logo
appear repeatedly to a national audience during the series. A second example is of-
fered by Welch and Calabro [1997] who suggest that Pro Player, an athletic apparel
company, went from being virtually unknown to being a major national brand largely
due to the national exposure gained during broadcasts of Miami Dolphins and Florida362 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Marlins games. Finally, the naming rights to the Corel Center, home of the NHL’s
Ottawa Senators, provides the Corel Corporation with an estimated 400 million an-
nual media impressions [Kaydo and Trusdell, 1997]. These examples help to illus-
trate one of the primary benefits of sponsorship—greater name recognition due to
effective media exposure. As with other forms of advertising, corporate sponsors be-
lieve this will result in increased sales [McCarthy and Irwin, 2000]. Given this, it is
reasonable to view the market for stadium names as a market for advertising space.
We develop a simple model of the market for facility naming rights where we
consider the behavior of two agents—the facility owner and the corporate sponsor.
The objective of the sponsor is to maximize the number of customer contacts, or “hits”,
through advertising subject to some advertising budget constraint. Because firms’
short-run objectives for advertising campaigns are varied, we are using the generic
term “hits” to represent a general measure of the impact or effectiveness of an adver-
tising expenditure. Depending on the sponsor’s short-run goal, hits may be the num-
ber of media impressions or they may be the number of sales that result from the
advertising. The sponsor has a number of means for advertising that include televi-
sion, radio, newspapers, and sport facility sponsorship. To simplify the notation we
will assume that there are just two choices for advertising, sponsorship (S) and an
aggregate alternative (A). For simplicity we will also assume that there is only one
facility and thus the sponsor does not have to choose between facilities. The market
for the aggregate alternative is assumed to be competitive and thus there is a market
price for a unit of advertising denoted PA. In the market for sponsorship, there are no
established prices and thus sponsors must submit bid prices to the facility owner.






























where B is the total advertising budget, HA[.] is an increasing function relating the
quantity of alternative advertisements to the expected number of hits from the ag-
gregate alternative, and HS
 is the expected number of hits that result from sponsor-
ship. This condition simply states that the maximum bid price is such that the num-
ber of expected total hits with and without sponsorships is the same. If the sponsor
can buy the naming rights for less than PO then total hits with sponsorship is greater
than without.
To focus on the owner’s naming rights decision we will assume that we can sepa-
rate the naming rights decision from other potentially related decisions the owner
may face regarding construction and facility location. Given this, we model the owner’s
problem as a revenue maximization problem.6 Total revenue is the sum of revenue
from events and naming rights revenue. Thus revenue is expressed as:
(2) R = RE + PO
where RE is the revenue from events and PO
 is the price received for facility sponsor-
ship. The revenue from events is modeled as follows:
(3) RE = f (N, V)363 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
where N is a measure of name recognition or nostalgia associated with the facility,
and V is a vector of other variables that affect revenue such as local population and
average income.
 Now consider how the naming rights decision affects the revenue stream for the
owner. The variables in V, and the effect they have on RE, are assumed to be indepen-
dent of whether or not the facility is named. For instance, population is not affected
by the naming rights decision and population should have a positive effect on RE
regardless. However, this is not the case with N, as name recognition is directly
affected by the naming rights decision. The premise is that a facility name that is
widely recognized is valuable in terms of generating revenue for the owner because a
larger N may result in more events and or more tickets sold per event. For instance,
for non-sporting events such as concerts, a promoter would prefer to book dates in a
famous arena such as Madison Square Garden as opposed to a facility with a widely
unrecognized name like Conseco Fieldhouse and thus greater name recognition may
lead to more events. For sporting events the logic is similar but nostalgia may play a
greater role. For example, a baseball game in Yankee Stadium is special for many
baseball fans because of the nostalgia and history associated with the facility. If
Yankee Stadium became Reebok Field, much of the historic or nostalgic value of
experiencing a game in Reebok field would be lost. Therefore, if sports fans are nos-
talgic then a reduction in N, all else equal, should reduce revenue from ticket sales at
sporting events.
Now consider the owner’s decision. The facility owner compares the present value
of the revenue streams with and without sponsorship and selects the larger of the
two. Let NS and NO represent the nostalgic value of the facility when it is sponsored
and when it is not sponsored respectively. Therefore, if f(NO, V) > [ f(NS, V) + PO], the
owner will not sell the naming rights. Another way to think about the owner’s prob-
lem is that the owner can solve for PR such that f(NO,V) = [f(NS,V) + PR
 ]. This yields
the owner’s reservation price, PR, for the naming rights to the facility.
When setting out to identify the determinants of naming rights prices it may be
tempting to simply regress price on a set of variables that describe the advertising
value of the facility. However, simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analy-
sis would be problematic for several reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious,
problem is that prices are determined by the interaction of demand and supply and
therefore one needs to consider a system of two simultaneous equations. The second,
and more unique, problem with using a simple OLS approach arises from the nature
of the type of supply and demand decisions being made in the naming rights market.
In most markets we typically think of supply and demand as smooth upward and
downward-sloping functions. This is accurate when firms are selecting output levels
or prices from a continuum and consumers are selecting quantities from a continuum
of possible values. However, the standard supply and demand model does not accu-
rately represent the market for stadium naming rights. In this market the quantity
decisions are dichotomous.7 For each stadium, the owner chooses to sell or not sell,
and thus the quantity supplied is 0 or 1. Likewise, sponsors either purchase the
rights (q = 1) or they do not (q = 0). Therefore, the supply and demand curves for this
market are as shown in Figures 1a and 1b.364 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The supply curves in Figures 1a and 1b show us that owners are willing to supply
the advertising space for any price that exceeds their reservation price, PR, and will
supply none at any price less than PR. Similarly, the demand curves show that at
prices greater than their maximum offer price, PO, firms will not purchase the adver-
tising space and at prices below PO firms will purchase. Figures 1a and 1b show the
two possible outcomes. In Figure 1a we see that if PR is greater than PO, Q = 0, and
thus the stadium is not named. In Figure 1b, PO is greater than PR and thus Q = 1,
and the naming rights are sold.
Figures 1a and 1b help to highlight the third reason why a standard approach
like OLS or two-stage least squares is inappropriate for this problem. The figures
show that the problem of studying the determinants of naming rights prices is really
a study of what determines PR and PO in a given market. Given this, two problems
emerge. The first is that we do not actually observe PR and PO, because we can only
observe PO and whether or not PO is greater than PR. The second problem is that for
all unnamed facilities depicted in Figure 1a, we do not observe PR or PO and therefore
these facilities would not be part of the data set if we use a standard simultaneous
equations approach. This market is a classic example of a truncated sample because
there is a subset of the sample for which we observe all the variables that determine
the equilibrium price but we do not observe the price itself. Therefore, to fully exploit
the useful data regarding this market, we will need to use an econometric model for
a truncated sample.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR SAMPLE SELECTION
The primary econometric challenge in modeling the facility naming rights mar-
ket is to address the issue of the truncated sample. The basic idea is that the process
 FIGURES 1a and 1b
Supply and Demand Curves for the
Sport Facility Naming Rights Market
Figure 1a Figure 1b
P












1      1     365 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
that determines whether a stadium is named is likely to be related to the process
that determines the price for naming rights. Therefore, having information regard-
ing a set of facilities where we know that PO < PR provides additional information
about how prices are determined in this market. In other words, the sample selection
process is endogenous and must be incorporated into our model.
To make full use of the available data we need to model the demand for naming
rights and the process by which facilities are selected for naming. Consider the fol-
lowing system of equations:
(4) Pi
O = XiB + ε1i
(5) Si = I(Pi
O   Pi
R) = Ziγ i + ε2i
where PO and PR are as defined above, Xi and Zi are vectors of explanatory variables,
ε1i and ε2i are error terms, I is an indicator function, Si is an indicator variable that is
equal to 1 when PO > PR and 0 otherwise, and B and γ are vectors of parameters to be
estimated. Equation 4 is the inverse demand equation and thus the variables in Xi
determine what a sponsor is willing to pay for naming rights. Equation 5 is the selec-
tion equation and thus Zi contains the demand variables and the supply determining
variables. These variables are discussed in greater detail below. The error terms ε1i
and ε2i have a bivariate normal distribution as follows:

















The key parameter here is  , which is the correlation between the error terms in
equations 4 and 5. This parameter helps to illustrate why the unnamed stadiums can
provide useful information. The error terms in the demand equation will be corre-
lated with the error terms from the selection equation if there are random shocks
that affect both PO and (PO   PR). This correlation will be positive if the shock only
affects PO but it could be positive or negative if the shock affects both PO and PR. If the
error terms are correlated and it is ignored, the estimates of B will be biased. Heckman
[1979] shows that the sample selection bias may be thought of as an omitted variable
problem. He develops a two-step estimation procedure where the selection bias is
estimated first. In the second step, the selection bias term is added to the equation of
interest thus making consistent estimation of the parameters possible. A version of
Heckman’s model is described below. 8
From equation 5 we see that when (PO  PR) > 0 the facility is named and thus PO
is observed. When (PO   PR) < 0 the facility is not named and therefore PO is not
observed. From equation 5 it may be noted that (Pi
O   Pi
R) > 0 J  ε2i >  Ziγ and thus
we may express the probability that PO is observed as:366 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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where   is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. In
addition, since equation 4 is incidentally truncated and the error terms from equa-
tions 4 and 5 are bivariate normal, then we may express the conditional expectation
of PO as:
(8) E[Pi
O   (PO   PR) > 0] = XiB +   1  i
where λi is the inverse Mills ratio and is given by:
(9)  i =   ( Ziγ/ 2)/[1   ( Ziγ/ 2)]
and   is the probability density function of the standard normal. Therefore, the sec-
ond term on the right-hand side of equation 8 measures the bias introduced by the
endogenous selection process. Equations 7 and 8 form the two-equation system that
we estimate. Equation 7 is the selection equation and measures the probability that
a given facility is named. Equation 8 represents the price that sponsors are willing to
pay for naming rights conditioned on the fact that the sponsor’s offer price exceeds
the owner’s reservation price.
To obtain unbiased estimates of the coefficients we use the following 2-step esti-
mation procedure. We first estimate γ / 2 by performing probit estimation on equa-
tion 7. Then we can compute  i and estimate equation 8 using OLS.9 Therefore, by
incorporating the unnamed facilities in our sample and using Heckman’s estimation
procedure we are able to measure the bias introduced by the endogenous selection
process. By estimating equations 7 and 8, as opposed to just estimating equation 4,
we are able to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Data were collected on all current North American sports facilities, named and
unnamed, that are the home site for at least one team that plays in a traditional
major professional sports league (NBA, NFL, NHL and MLB). While naming rights
are sold to minor league and collegiate sport facilities, the sample was limited to
major professional sports for this study. Altogether, data were collected for 56 facili-
ties where naming rights were sold and 42, which were unnamed thus giving us a
total of 98 observations.
The dependent variable for the price equation is the average annual amount paid
by the corporate sponsor, adjusted for inflation.10 The dependent variable for the selec-
tion model is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the naming rights were sold, 0
otherwise. Based on our model, a review of the literature, and the availability of usable
data, we identified a set of independent variables that may affect the naming rights
decisions of facility owners and potential sponsors. The following explanatory vari-
ables are used: (For a more detailed explanation of these variables see Appendix C.)367 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
Supply Variables (elements of Z only)
YEAR The year the facility was built. YEAR serves as a proxy for name
recognition. Older established names are more widely recognized.
Therefore name recognition is inversely related to YEAR.
OWNER Ownership dummy variable (1 = private ownership, 0 otherwise).
COST The original construction cost for the facility, adjusted for inflation
and reported in U.S. dollars.
Demand Variables (elements of both X and Z)
GAMES The number of regular season games played by the major professional
teams that are tenants.11
INCOME The median real household income of the metropolitan statistical area,
adjusted for inflation, in which the facility is located.
MSAPOP Total population in metropolitan statistical area.
ATTEND Average game attendance of tenants.
FACTYPE Dummy variable representing indoor and outdoor facilities (1 = out-
door, 0 otherwise).
OTHFAC Dummy variable representing the presence of other major pro sport
facilities in the market (1 = the presence of at least one other facility
in the market, 0 = no other facilities in the market).
SPONYEAR The year the sponsor acquired the naming rights. Serves as a time
variable in the pricing equation.
TEAMSUCC The winning percentages of tenant teams over the previous five years
as a measure of on-field success. Given the existence of multiple ten-
ants, TEAMSUCC is calculated as the mean of the winning percent-
ages for each team over 5 years prior to the year in which the facility
was named. The result is then weighted based on the number of games
played by each tenant annually.
POSTSUCC A second measure of on-field success. It is the number of times over
the previous seven years that facility tenants qualified for the
postseason. The variable is reported as a percentage.12
NEWTEAM Dummy variable representing the presence of a new team in a facil-
ity where there was an opportunity to sell naming rights (1 = an ex-
pansion team or a team that has relocated to a facility where there is
an opportunity to sell naming rights, 0 = all others).
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The results from estimating equations 7 and 8 using Heckman’s two-step proce-
dure are reported in Table 1.13 The table reports results for the “selection equation”,
which measures how the independent variables affect the probability that a facility
will be named, and the “price equation”, which measures the direct effect that vari-
ables have on the price sponsors are willing to pay.14 The results from the selection368 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
equation are rather interesting in that the only significant variable is the name rec-
ognition variable. The coefficient is positive and highly significant, which suggests
that facilities with well-known names are less likely to be named. This result is con-
sistent with our theoretical model as the owner’s reservation price is increasing in N.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this result is that it highlights the fact that
sponsorship comes with a cost. When the opportunity cost is too large, as it may be
with facilities such as Madison Square Garden and Fenway Park, it does not make
TABLEe 1
Heckman 2         Step Model
Selection Equation : Dependent Variable is the sale of naming rights (0=no; 1= yes)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>z
OWNER  .284 .328  .86 .387
COST  1.49E 9 1.86E 9  .80 .424
YEAR .057 .015 3.87 .00
TEAMSUCC .194 2.36 .082 .935
FACTYPE .044 .453 .098 .922
ATTEND  2.33E 6 1.3E 5  .179 .858
MSAPOP  2.32E 8 4.19E 8  .554 .580
INCOME 2.42E 5 3.32E 5 .73 .466
GAMES .0048 .0082 .585 .559
NEWTEAM  .064 .425  .15 .88
POSTSUCC .244 .643 .38 .704
OTHFAC .10 .438 .23 .818
Constant  113.8 29.43  3.87 .00
Price Equation: Dependent Variable is average annual price
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P>z
SPONYEAR .256 .076 3.38 .001
TEAMSUCC 2.66 3.53 .753 .452
FACTYPE  .312 .583  .534 .593
ATTEND 1.18E 5 1.85E 5 .638 .523
MSAPOP 8.63E 8 5.46E 8 1.58 .114
INCOME 3.14E 5 3.94E 5 .796 .426
GAMES  .002 .01  .181 .857
NEWTEAM .933 .536 1.74 .082
POSTSUCC .153 1.01 .151 .88
OTHFAC .87 .617 1.41 .159
Constant  512.4 150.8  3.39 .001
Athrho cons  .606 .339  1.79 .074
Lnsigma cons .36 .133 2.69 .007
Rho ( )  .542
Sigma ( ) 1.43
Lambda ( )  .776 .42369 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
sense for owners to sell their names. If not for this name recognition effect owners
would have no incentive to decline sponsorship.
From the price equation we see that several variables have a significant effect on
price. The coefficient on the year variable is .256 and significant at the .01 level. This
suggests that, all else equal, average annual sponsorship prices increased by $256,000
a year during the sample period. Given that the dollar figures are all real values, we
did not have any prior beliefs about the sign of the year variable, but it was included
to capture any potentially important time effects. We will discuss some possible im-
plications of this result below. Another variable that has a significant effect on price
is the arrival of a new team to the facility. This coefficient is equal to .933 and has a
p-value of .082. This suggests that sponsors of facilities with a new expansion team
or a newly relocated team pay $933,000 more per year compared to facilities that do
not house a “new” team. This new team premium may reflect the sponsors’ anticipa-
tion that they will have above average exposure because of the new team to the
region or league. The coefficient on population is marginally significant as it has a p-
value of .114.15 As anticipated, the population variable is positive suggesting that
sponsors are willing to pay more for facilities in areas with larger populations. This is
consistent with the notion that firms purchasing naming rights in highly populated
areas are effectively buying additional advertising. The other variables in the price
equation generally have the correct sign but are statistically insignificant.16
It is interesting to note that the year of sponsorship is highly significant while
many of the variables one might think would be important such as the on-field suc-
cess of teams, the ownership structure of the facility, the average attendance per
game, the number of games played per year, and median income in the surrounding
area all have little or no effect on the price of naming rights. One possible explana-
tion for the significance of time and the insignificance of many of the explanatory
variables is that what we have observed thus far is a market in its infancy. Perhaps
one of the reasons that sponsors are now willing to pay more for the naming rights is
that over time demand has increased significantly as firms have learned about the
value and effectiveness of naming a facility. To investigate this we looked at the
growth in naming rights prices and the growth in average prices for other advertis-
ing media. It is interesting to note that prices in the facility naming rights market
have grown at a much faster rate than several other traditional forms of advertising.
Since 1988, naming rights prices have grown annually at a rate of 14.57 percent,
adjusted for inflation. Over the same time period, network television and magazine
advertising rates have grown at rates of 2.19 percent and 8.46 percent, respectively
[www.tvb.org, 2000].17 These growth rates are consistent with our hypothesis that
price variation in naming rights is largely explained by sharp increases in the spon-
sors’ perceived value of naming a facility as opposed to the underlying facility and
team characteristics.
Lastly, we note that the estimate for  , which measures the correlation between
the error terms in equations 4 and 5, is  .542 with a p-value of .074. This last result
is important because it suggests that there indeed is a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the shocks that affect the error terms in equations 4 and 5. There-370 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
fore, there is information from the unnamed facilities that may be exploited in esti-
mating the price equation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we examine the price determinants in the growing market for sport
facility naming rights in North America. In this market, sample selection bias is a
problem and therefore we use an econometric model with an endogenous selection
process. We use an estimation procedure developed by Heckman that enables us to
include information from all facilities, named and unnamed, to derive unbiased esti-
mates of the price determinants.
Our results seem to be consistent with the model of the naming rights market
discussed above. One key result is that the name recognition effect is significant. The
data suggests that the most important factor in determining whether a facility will
be named is the age of the existing name. From the selection equation we see that
facilities with older, widely-recognized names are less likely to be named because the
opportunity cost of selling the name apparently becomes quite substantial.
Our results also indicate that sponsors are willing to pay more to name a facility
that is home to a “new” team. This may indicate that sponsors expect that expansion
teams and relocating teams will receive above-average media exposure. Similarly,
we note that population in the area around the facility has a positive effect on price.
One interpretation of this may be that firms that buy naming rights for a facility in a
populated area must pay more because they are effectively paying for additional
advertising that they would not receive from a facility in a less populated area. These
results seem to be consistent with the existing literature on facility naming rights as
many authors have suggested that the prime motivation for sponsorship is cost-ef-
fective advertising.
Somewhat surprisingly we found that other than population and the new team
effect, the only variable that significantly affects the naming rights prices is the year
the facility’s naming rights were sold. Our analysis shows that as time has passed
the real prices for naming rights have increased and that the growth in these prices
has significantly outpaced the growth in prices for other forms of advertising. One
possible explanation for this rapid growth in prices is that the market for naming
rights was not a mature market in the 1990s. Therefore, we did not observe prices
fluctuating around an equilibrium level but instead witnessed a strong upward trend
as sponsors became aware of the cost effectiveness of facility sponsorship. If our hy-
pothesis is correct, one would expect to see real prices leveling off in the future as the
market converges to more of a steady state. Thus in future research it may be inter-
esting to see if the statistical significance of time lessens and other explanatory vari-
ables such as attendance and on-field success have a more measurable effect on price.371 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
APPENDIX A
Naming Rights Deals
Year of Price Number Average
Name Location Sponsorship (in mill.$) of Years Price
Arrowhead Pond Anaheim, CA 1993 15.00 10 1.50
Edison International Field Anaheim, CA 1998 50.00 20 2.50
Philips Arena Atlanta, GA 1999 180.00 20 9.00
PSINet Stadium Baltimore, MD 1999 105.00 20 5.20
FleetCenter Boston, MA 1995 30.00 15 2.00
Marine Midland Arena Buffalo, NY 1996 15.00 20 0.75
Can. Airlines Saddledome Calgary, AB 1995 C$10.00 20 0.50
Ericsson Stadium Charlotte, NC 1996 20.00 10 2.00
United Center Chicago, IL 1994 36.00 20 1.80
Cinergy Field Cincinnati, OH 1996 6.00 6 1.00
Gund Arena Cleveland, OH 1994 14.00 20 0.70
Jacobs Fields Cleveland, OH 1994 13.90 20 0.70
American Airlines Center Dallas, TX 2000 90.00 20 4.50
Coors Field Denver, CO 1995 15.00 10 1.50
Pepsi Center Denver, CO 1998 68.00 20 3.90
Comerica Park Detroit, MI 2000 66.00 30 2.20
Cont. Airlines Arena East Rutherford, NJ 1996 29.00 12 2.42
Skyreach Center Edmonton, ON 1998 C$5.00 5 1.00
Compaq Center Houston, TX 1997 5.40 6 0.90
Enron Field Houston, TX 2000 100.00 30 3.33
Conseco Fieldhouse Indianapolis, IN 1999 40.00 20 2.00
RCA Dome Indianapolis, IN 1994 10.00 10 1.00
Alltel Stadium Jacksonville, FL 1997 6.20 10 0.62
Corel Center Kanata,ON 1996 C$26.00 20 1.30
Staples Center Los Angeles, CA 1999 116.00 20 5.53
American Airlines Arena Miami, FL 1999 42.00 20 2.10
Pro Player Stadium Miami, FL 1996 20.00 10 2.00
Miller Park Milwaukee, WI 2000 41.20 20 2.06
Target Center Minneapolis, MN 1990 18.75 15 1.25
Molson Center Montreal, QE 1996 20.00 21 1.05
Adelphia Coliseum Nashville, TN 1999 30.00 15 2.00
Gaylord Center Nashville, TN 1999 80.00 20 4.00
Network Associates Col. Oakland, CA 1998 6.00 5 1.20
TD Waterhouse Orlando, FL 2000 7.80 5 1.56
First Union Center Philadelphia, PA 1996 40.00 29 1.38
America West Arena Phoenix, AZ 1989 26.00 30 0.87
Bank One Ballpark Phoenix, AZ 1998 66.0 30 2.20
Mellon Arena Pittsburgh, PA 1999 18.00 10 1.80
PNC Park Pittsburgh, PA 2001 20.00 40 2.00
Ford Stadium Pontiac, MI 1996 40.00 40 1.00
Arco Arena Sacramento, CA 1997 10.00 7 1.43
Delta Center Salt Lake City, UT 1991 25.00 20 1.25
Qualcomm Stadium San Diego, CA 1997 18.00 20 0.90
3Com Park San Francisco, CA 1995 4.00 5 0.80
Pacific Bell Park San Francisco, CA 2000 50.00 24 2.08
Key Arena Seattle, WA 1995 15.10 15 1.01
Safeco Field Seattle, WA 1999 36.00 20 1.80
TransWorld Dome St. Louis, MO 1995 36.70 20 1.84
Tropicana Field St. Petersburg, FL 1998 46.00 30 1.53
National Car Rental Center Sunrise, FL 1998 25.00 10 2.50
Raymond James Stadium Tampa Bay, FL 1998 55.00 18 3.06
Air Canada Center Toronto, ON 1999 C$45.00 15 3.00
General Motors Place Vancouver, BC 1995 C$18.5 20 0.93
FedEx Field Washington, DC 1999 205.00 27 7.40
MCI Center Washington, DC 1998 44.00 20 2.20
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APPENDIX B
Unnamed Facilities
Facility Location Year of Type of
Construction Ownership
Charlotte Coliseum Charlotte 1988 Public
Madison Square Garden New York City 1925a Private
Palace of Auburn Hills Auburn Hills, MI 1988 Private
Alamodome San Antonio 1993 Public
Reunion Arena Dallas 1980 Public
Rose Garden Portland 1995 Private
Georgia Dome Atlanta 1992 Public
Giants Stadium East Rutherford, NJ 1976 Public
Lambeau Field Green Bay 1957 Public
H.H. Humphrey Metrodome Minneapolis 1982 Public
Silverdome Pontiac, MI 1975 Public
Soldier Field Chicago 1924 Public
Sun Devil Stadium Tempe, AZ 1958 Public
Superdome New Orleans 1975 Public
Texas Stadium Irving, TX 1971 Private
Veterans Stadium Philadelphia 1971 Public
Arrowhead Stadium Kansas City 1972 Public
Paul Brown Field Cleveland 1999 Public
Foxboro Stadium Foxboro, MA 1971 Public
Kingdome Seattle 1976 Public
Mile High Stadium Denver 1948 Public
Three Rivers Stadium Pittsburgh 1970 Public
Ice Palace Tampa Bay 1996 Private
Nassau County Coliseum Uniondale, NY 1972 Public
Raleigh Sports Arena Raleigh 1999 Public
Joe Louis Arena Detroit 1979 Public
Kiel Center St. Louis 1994 Private
San Jose Arena San Jose 1993 Public
Yankee Stadium New York City 1923 Public
Fenway Park Boston 1912 Private
Skydome Toronto 1989 Private
Camden Yards Baltimore 1992 Public
Comiskey Park Chicago 1991 Public
Kauffmann Field Kansas City 1973 Public
Ballpark at Arlington Arlington, TX 1994 Public
Turner Field Atlanta 1997 Private
Olympic Stadium Montreal 1977 Public
Wrigley Field Chicago 1916 Private
Milwaukee County Stadium Milwaukee 1953 Public
The Arena Oakland, CA 1966 Public
Dodger Stadium Los Angeles 1962 Private
a. The current MSG was actually built in 1968 but there has been an MSG in New York City since 1925.
We estimated the model using both dates and the results are essentially identical.373 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
APPENDIX C
Explanatory Variables
Number of games played (GAMES) – This variable was defined as the number of regular season games
played by the tenant teams from the four major professional leagues that are housed in the facilities
studied. All of the facilities hosted at least one team, and some have additional tenants.18 It was
expected that corporate sponsors would be willing to pay a higher price for naming rights in facilities
that hosted more sporting events; therefore a positive relationship was expected.
Median real household income (INCOME) – The median real household income of the metropolitan
statistical area, adjusted for inflation, in which the facility is located. It is expected that a positive
relationship exists between this variable and the naming rights price.
Total population in metropolitan statistical area (MSAPOP) – It is anticipated that as the number
of potential consumers who are exposed to the named facility increases, the amount that firms are
willing to pay for the advertising opportunity will also increase. Also, while firms receive a large
amount of national exposure through the media, both Irwin & Sutton (1995) and Schlossberg (1996)
cite the local marketing opportunities as a motivation for the acquisition of naming rights. It is
expected that the naming rights price and MSA population will have a positive relationship.
Average game attendance of tenants (ATTEND) – Companies that acquire naming rights want their
name exposed to the maximum number of consumers possible. Obviously, companies want their
name attached to a facility that has a high number of consumers attending events each year. The
average attendance was selected instead of total attendance because total attendance depends on the
number of games played in the facility, which is also included in the model. Thus, average attendance
is a more appropriate measure of attendance because it is independent of the number of games
played. It is difficult to predict future attendance, so the average of game attendance of the tenants
over the seven years prior to the acquisition of naming rights was calculated. It is anticipated that a
positive relationship will exist between average annual attendance and naming rights price.19
Ownership dummy (OWNER) – All of the facilities included in the sample are owned by either a
private corporation (ex. First Union Center in Philadelphia is owned by ComcastSpectacor) or a
government entity (ex. Alltel Stadium is owned by the City of Jacksonville).20 A dummy variable was
used to capture the ownership status of the facilities (0 = public ownership, 1= private ownership). It
is expected that the private ownership groups may be more profit motivated than government enti-
ties and therefore it is anticipated that a positive relationship exists between the ownership variable
and naming rights price.
Type of facility (FACTYPE) – All of the facilities were separated into two types, indoor and outdoor (1
= outdoor, 0 = indoor). Generally, there are some important differences between the types of facili-
ties. Indoor facilities are usually smaller in size. In our sample most indoor facilities had a capacity of
18,000 to 24,000 seats. Indoor facilities can also be used during all months of the year, regardless of
location. In contrast, outdoor, or open air, facilities are usually large, capacity of 40,000 to 75,000
seats. While these additional seats will expose more consumers to a named facility, the possibility of
poor weather during the winter months in many locations may lead to a smaller number of events.
Lastly, while an indoor facility may have tenants from any of the four major professional sports
leagues, an outdoor facility can only house a NFL or MLB team.21
Other facilities (OTHFAC) – All of the facilities were separated into two categories (1 = the presence of
at least one other facility in the market that houses a team from the four major sports, 0 = there are
no other facilities in the market that host a major professional sport team). The additional supply of
other facilities may affect the price that prospective sponsors are willing to pay. A negative relation-
ship between this variable and the price paid by a sponsor is expected.
Real construction cost (COST) – The original construction cost for each facility was included in the
model. The cost was adjusted for inflation and reported in US dollars. It is expected that a positive
relationship will exist between this variable and the naming rights price, as additional revenue sources
may be necessary as costs increase. Therefore, owners may be more willing to sell naming rights as
construction cost increases.
Construction year (YEAR) – The construction year serves as a proxy for name recognition. The names
of older facilities are more widely recognized than the names of newer facilities. All else equal, greater
name recognition should lead to larger revenues from events for the facility owner. Given this we
would expect that newer facilities are more likely to be named.374 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Sponsorship year (SPONYEAR) – The year that the naming rights deal began serves as a time vari-
able in the price equation. Sponsorship year should identify any important trends over time in the
naming rights market.
Tenant playing success (TEAMSUCC) –The tenants (teams) of these facilities have varying levels of
on-field success. Given all else equal, a corporation would rather have their name attached to a
facility with a team that has a .900 winning percentage as compared to a team with a .100 winning
percentage. It is expected that a positive relationship would exist between the on-field success of
tenants and the price of naming rights. Not only is the corporation’s name attached to a winning
organization, but a winning team should receive more media exposure than a losing team. The addi-
tional team exposure should also lead to additional exposure for the company whose name is at-
tached to the home facility of that team. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict the future success of
professional sports teams. Due to this, our study used the winning percentages of tenant teams over
the previous five years as a measure of on-field success. In addition, the existence of multiple tenants
resulted in some problems when developing a variable to measure tenant playing success. Given the
existence of multiple tenants, the mean of the winning percentages for each team over 5 years prior
to the year in which the facility was named were calculated. The result was then weighted based on
the number of games played by each tenant annually. For example, if a facility housed both an NBA
and NHL team (both leagues play 41 home dates) then the mean winning percentages over the
previous 5 years were equally weighted. The weighted products for each team were then averaged to
result in a weighted mean winning percentage for the tenants of the facility.22
Postseason success (POSTSUCC) – A measure of the on-field success of facility tenants. Intuitively, we
would expect that corporate sponsors have a higher demand for facilities that house teams that
qualify for the playoffs. Therefore, the expectation was for a positive relationship between this vari-
able and the price paid by corporate sponsors. The variable was calculated by determining the num-
ber of times that the facility’s tenant(s) qualified for the postseason in the 7 seasons previous to the
naming of the facility.23 For example, for a facility that has a single tenant that qualified for the
postseason in 5 of the 7 years prior to the naming of the facility, the variable has the value of .714.
Presence of a new team (NEWTEAM) – A dummy variable representing the presence of a new team to
a facility where there is an opportunity to sell the naming rights. The naming rights price may be
affected by the presence of a new team, either through expansion or relocation, to a market. A spon-
sor may be willing to pay a higher price for the name of a facility that will house a new team. A new
team may bring interest and excitement to the local market that is not present if a sponsor purchases
the name of a facility that houses an existing team. This variable is coded as a 1 for facilities where
there was a new team that moved into the facility since 1988 and there was an opportunity to sell the
naming rights when the new team arrived. For all other facilities, the variable has a value of 0. A
positive relationship between this variable and price is expected.
NOTES
Paul Jensen thanks the Lebow College of Business at Drexel University for partial funding of this
research.
1. See Heckman [1976; 1979]
2. Facilities such as Wrigley Field in 1926 and Busch Stadium in 1953 were named after the corpora-
tions that owned the tenant teams. While these were not naming rights deals, the placement of the
corporate names was seen as an advertising tool [McCarthy and Irwin, 1998].
 3. For our purposes major professional sports in North America includes the National Football league
(NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League
Baseball (MLB).
4. Welch and Calabro [1997] point out that it is possible that local residents may resent a corporation
for renaming their stadium. However, as it has become commonplace it seems that people have
grown to accept it and thus the negative repercussions seem to be diminished.
5. These examples are discussed in McCarthy and Irwin [1998].
6. Revenue maximization is approximately true in this case because the major cost associated with a
facility is the fixed cost of building the facility. In addition, the revenues gained from sponsorship are
generally far greater than any change in facility operating costs due to changes in attendance result-375 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
ing from a decision regarding naming rights. If we had considered profit maximization, the model
itself would be slightly more complicated but it would not affect any of the results.
7. If one wanted to study the sale of parts of a facility, then something other than dichotomous demand
and supply would probably be necessary. Deals that only include the sale of entrances/portals/con-
courses constitute a different market due to their lack of national media exposure. Since our focus is
on the overall facility name, our dichotomous representation seems appropriate.
8. The econometric model we present is described in Cramer [1986].
9. See Heckman [1976; 1979] for more details on the Heckman two-step procedure.
10. Most sponsorship deals differ a bit in terms of payment schedules. As a result, the use of annual
average price is, of course, an approximation for the real price paid by the firm. Ideally we would like
to have the exact information on payment schedules from the actual contracts but, given the propri-
etary nature of the contracts, the information is simply not available for our total data set. Our
research suggests that most deals are similar in structure and thus average annual price is an appro-
priate approximation. Larger variations in schedules will result in larger residuals but this should
not be a problem as long as the variations in schedules are not correlated with our explanatory
variables.
11. We attempted to obtain data on the number of non-sporting events at each facility but we were
unable to get the data. From the sponsor’s point of view, non-sporting events are probably not impor-
tant as they usually don’t receive national media coverage as sporting events do. However, these
events may be important to the owner’s revenue stream. This would be particularly true for well-
known, indoor facilities in bigger cities where they are likely to have a significant number of non-
sporting events. Given this, it may be that our indoor /outdoor dummy, population, and name recog-
nition variables will pick up much of the effect of non-sporting events.
12. Given that there is no previous data for expansion teams, they were coded as .00. Intuitively, con-
sumers expect expansion teams to have minimal on-field success.
13. Estimates were obtained using the Heckman two-step estimation procedure in STATA.
14. Almost all naming rights deals also include some auxiliary benefits for the sponsor such as luxury
boxes. Since the sponsorship deals are based on private contracts, prices broken out for auxiliary
benefits versus naming rights are generally not observable. However, as long as the primary objec-
tive of sponsors is national media recognition the price associated with the deal should primarily
reflect the advertising value of the naming rights. If one thinks of the level of auxiliary benefits as an
omitted variable then this may lead to omitted variable bias in our estimates. As long as the level of
auxiliary benefits is not correlated with our explanatory variables then our results should still be
unbiased.
15. We should note that in other specifications we examined, population was significant at the .01level.
A number of other specifications were considered but the results are not reported because these
specifications suffered from multicollinearity problems. The purpose of the population variable is to
measure the size of the market. Other measures that we considered for this purpose were the num-
ber of firms with over 500 employees in the MSA and the number of TV households in the designated
market area. These variables were dropped because they were highly correlated with population and
median income, and because these data were not available for the 8 Canadian facilities.
16. We also attempted to measure the effect of having to “rename” a facility. One might suspect that
there is less advertising value in paying to rename an existing facility as opposed to putting a name
on a new facility because when a facility is renamed there may be some people who continue to use
the original name. To check this, we included a dummy variable to distinguish between new names
and renames. The rename effect was highly insignificant and the inclusion of the variable did not
significantly alter any of our other results. The reason we do not include the rename variable in our
reported results is that there are problems with trying to include that variable in the model. The
problem is that for some of the unnamed facilities we cannot classify them as either requiring a name
change or not requiring a name change because their status changed during the period of our sample.
For example, Camden Yards was built in 1992 and at that point in time a sponsor could have named
the park without a name change. However, after 1992 a name change would be required and thus
there is not a way to classify this facility as being in just one category. Because of this difficulty and
the insignificance of the variable in the price equation we dropped it altogether.
17. We should note that we were unable to obtain data on the cost of advertising by city as it appears that
this information is not publicly available. We also tried to obtain data on prices for local broadcast
rights for baseball, hockey and basketball but these were also unavailable.376 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
18. The Staples Center in Los Angeles is the only facility that has more than two tenants (Los Angeles
Kings, Lakers, and Clippers).
19. We should note that for the unnamed facilities, attendance figures from the mid-1990s are used to
calculate average attendance.
20. A number of facilities are owned by quasi-government authorities. For example, Continental Airlines
Arena in East Rutherford, NJ is owned by the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority (NJSEA).
The NJSEA was established by the State of New Jersey for the purpose of operating and managing
the facility complex. These types of ownership arrangements are categorized as public ownership for
this study.
21. Retractable roof and domed facilities are categorized as indoor facilities.
22. Once again, the team records from the mid-1990s are used for those facilities that are not named. In
addition, for expansion teams with no previous record, the team’s playing record in their first season
was used as a measure of playing success.
 23. Once again, postseason success from the mid-1990s is used for those facilities that are not named.
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